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Introduction 
The link between terrorism and sport is not a new development (most dramatically evident at 
the Olympics of 1972 and 1996). Yet, recent events seem to indicate that sports and 
sportspeople have become increasingly targeted by terrorists. Examples have included the 
gun attack in March 2009 in Lahore on the Sri Lankan cricket team, the suicide bomb attack 
on spectators at a volleyball match in Laki Marwat, North-West Pakistan in January 2010, 
and the gun attack in Cabinda, Angola on the Togo national football team in the same month. 
Earlier, in August 2009, the English badminton team withdrew from the World 
Championships in Hyderabad due to a specific terrorist threat. Given the enormous publicity 
potential of an attack on the Olympics, the 2012 Games again raises the spectre of the 
convergence of terrorism and sport.  
The following will assess the utility of the Olympics and sports events (and indeed 
sportspeople) as terrorist targets. Although the Olympics in general itself presents a 
‘hardened’ target, given the global audience that is focused on the Games, and the fact that 
some venues, cities, and transport systems will inevitably be less protected than others, it still 
represents an alluring target. Indeed, any attack on the UK during Games time would 
arguably be an attack on the Olympics itself. Beyond the Olympics, the following will 
consider whether or not the recent spate of terrorist attacks on sports represents part of a 
developing trend. It will ultimately argue that terrorism has had the most impact on sport 
(mainly cricket) in South Asia, particularly Pakistan and India, both due to direct attacks on 
sports targets but also due to other terrorist attacks (such as Mumbai) that have impacted on 
perceptions of security (or lack of) at sporting venues in these countries. The direct sporting 
attacks of Lahore and Laki Marwat (and indeed the attack on the Togo football team) were 
arguably motivated by relatively local agendas and have not since been replicated elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, given the propensity of Al Qaeda to target high profile and mass casualty 
targets, and the indiscriminate nature of its violence permitted by its ideological parameters, 
it would be dangerous to ignore the potential threat that it represents to major sports events 
and sportspeople in Western countries and elsewhere. 
This chapter will begin by briefly assessing what is meant by ‘terrorism’ and how some 
features of terrorism illuminate the significance of events such as the Olympics for terrorist 
targeting purposes. Terrorism is communication and the Olympics provides a prime 
opportunity and illustration of the value of the media in publicising a terrorist organisation’s 
cause. Before assessing the utility of such events as targets for terrorists, however, the chapter 
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will provide a brief historical overview as to how in fact the Olympics and sport in general 
have more broadly been subject to political manipulation, dating back to ancient times when 
they were exploited to enhance physical strength and military prowess. It will then go on to 
consider how they have been politically exploited by those using terrorism and what impact 
this has had on sport, before returning to the Olympic theme in particular by considering the 
threats that Al Qaeda and dissident Irish republicans pose to London 2012. 
Features of terrorism and their implications for the Olympics  
Terrorism can be described as a particular method of violence and/or the threat of violence that 
has been carried out by a wide range of actors (both state and non-state), that often targets 
civilians, is usually for a political purpose and is usually designed to have a psychological 
impact beyond the immediate victims. A subset of terrorism is the concept of non-state 
terrorism which can be described as a particular method of violence and/or the threat of 
violence that has been carried out by non-state actors in order to coerce a government and its 
population, that often targets civilians, is usually for a political purpose and is usually designed 
to have a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. While states are most certainly 
culpable as perpetrators of terrorism (whether they have carried out acts of terrorism, have 
sponsored terrorism or have perpetrated what has often been called ‘state terror’) it is non-state 
terrorism that states are primarily concerned with in their efforts to defend their homelands.1 
This distinction is important because it allows us to transcend the current debate over the extent, 
if at all, to which ‘the state’ as perpetrator has been excluded from terrorism studies (and also 
from definitions of terrorism) (Jackson, 2009). So for the purposes of this chapter the definition 
of non-state terrorism will be used. 
Notwithstanding such distinctions, terrorism seeks to generate a wider impact beyond the 
immediate victims of an attack. It is about communicating a message, often to a number of 
target audiences (whether they be a perceived constituency of support, the international 
community or an adversary) – and it is the desire to transmit a message at the global level and 
even to capture the world’s attention (as the Black September attack did in 1972) that 
potentially makes sports events an attractive target.  
The Olympic movement, as an international endeavour that seeks to promote peace and 
harmony, is ideally positioned to appreciate one of the major obstacles to countering 
terrorism – the inability of the international community to agree a definition of the 
phenomenon and therefore the degree of difficulty in generating international cooperation 
against those who would resort to terrorism. Even after the most devastating attack ever to 
have afflicted the Olympics in Munich 1972 the then Secretary General of the United Nations 
Kurt Waldheim, in his efforts to encourage member states to agree to the need for ‘measures 
to prevent terrorist and other forms of violence which endanger or take human lives or 
jeopardise fundamental freedoms’, was confronted by deep concern from some African and 
Arab states that those engaged in legitimate national liberation struggles would be classified 
as terrorists (Wardlaw,1989:105). Although it seems to be more useful to view terrorism as a 
                                                            
1 The exception to this in the Olympic context was the threat posed by North Korea against the Seoul games of 
1988 
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method 2as opposed to focusing on those definitions that are perpetrator based the problem of 
the subjective nature and use of the term persists to this day. 
 
Sport as a political and military weapon 
Before exploring further the exploitation of the Olympic Games by terrorist groups, it is 
worth reminding ourselves that the Olympics and sport in general have long been the subject 
of political exploitation. Despite calls that politics should be left out of sport (perhaps most 
notably by those who advocated the increase of sporting links with South Africa during 
apartheid) the fact is that sport has inevitably become prey to political manipulation both in 
the contemporary world and indeed in ancient times. 
‘Sport’ is a shortened form of the original term of ‘disport’, meaning a diversion or an 
amusement (Brasch, 1986: 1). Apart from the natural desire to compete, the impetus behind 
sport was also for man to be able to more effectively defend himself and his tribe, to learn to 
run fast, to jump and to swim. Sporting activities such as archery, judo and karate were 
invented in order to tackle opponents (Ibid:2). The development of sports that required 
physical strength found much of its origin in the desire to defend against and conquer one’s 
enemies. Thus chariot racing, boxing and wrestling were inextricably linked to the defence of 
cities; indeed ‘ultimately, there was only one intent and aim of athletic contests: to feint the 
stress of battle; to stay sharp and ready for war’ (Spivey, 2004:18). Despite the not 
uncommon contention that ‘good athletes do not necessarily make good soldiers’, physical 
strength and traditions of ‘rigorous gymnastic upbringing’, perhaps typified by the Spartans, 
were linked to military prowess (ibid: 27). Miller, referring to the Greek city-states from 
around 525 BC states that ‘athletics were clearly a tool of ancient political aggrandizement – 
just as they are today’, with coins used to ‘advertise victories at Olympia and other 
games’(Miller, 2004: p. 218). 
The intertwinement of military power and Olympic success was illustrated by the entry by 
Alkibiades of seven chariots at the Olympiad of 416 BC against the backdrop of the 
Peloponnesian War. In anticipation of an Athenian victory he apparently proclaimed that: 
‘The Greeks who had been hoping that our city was exhausted by the war came to 
think of our power as even greater than it is because of my magnificent embassy at 
Olympia. I entered seven tethrippa [chariots], a number never before entered by a 
private citizen, and I came in first, second, and fourth’ (Miller: 221). 
Many centuries later the link between sports and the military was also explicitly encouraged 
by the United States armed forces in the run up to World War I where sports and athletic 
training were made ‘a central component of military life’ (Pope, 1997: 139). Indeed, sports 
                                                            
2 As Leonard Weinberg rightly observed the notion of ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ 
confuses the goal with the activity (Weinberg 2008, p. 2). 
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were accepted as ‘essential elements of a soldier’s responsibility’ that ‘made good military 
sense in developing needed physical endurance’ (ibid:144). 
Sport has also been used to promote national fervour and nation-building. Italy’s football 
World Cup triumph in 1938 was seen as uniting the Italian diaspora behind Mussolini’s 
fascist regime and for generating a communal identity (Martin :2004, p. 1). To this end the 
regime was credited with regenerating Italian society through sport with particular emphasis 
on exploiting the mass appeal of football (or ‘calcio’) for political goals (Martin: 2004, p. 15 
and 2). The 1936 Olympics in Berlin, which was awarded to the city at least partly to bring 
Germany back into the international fold after World War 1, provided Adolf Hitler with an 
opportunity to showcase the Germany that he was moulding and it became an enormous 
propaganda exercise for nazism (Hilton). Apart from such nation-building the Olympic 
Games has also been the victim of the turmoil of international politics. They did not take 
place at all in 1916, 1940 and 1944 because of the two world wars.  
The very fact, of course, that athletes are identified with a state is a political statement in 
itself. Indeed, it was hoped that through the presence of their delegation at the Atlanta Games, 
Palestinians could use sport as a stepping stone to nationhood (Sanan p. 305). For host 
nations it is seen as an opportunity to showcase their country to the many thousands of 
tourists and millions of watchers. It can therefore also, conversely, be used as a political tool 
to undermine a host country’s attempts to enhance its international profile and, as such, the 
spectacle has often been subject to the vagaries of the international politics of the time. The 
context of the Cold War, for example, provided the backdrop against which boycotting the 
Olympics became a political weapon. The US led boycott of the Moscow games in 1980 (in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) was reciprocated by the Soviet Union when it 
stayed away from the Los Angeles games of 1984.  
Sports have been exploited for other more positive political reasons – as the means to 
underpin diplomacy in international politics. This was perhaps most evident through the 
‘ping-pong’ diplomacy that took place between The United States and China after the 
American ‘Ping-Pong’ team accepted an invitation to visit China in April 1971. It was 
followed by the visit of President Nixon to the People’s Republic in 1972. In this case sport 
had clearly served as a lever to improve relations between the two countries.  
Yet, while sports events have been manipulated for a variety of reasons, conversely, ‘all 
sports have [also] had to take a view on international politics’ (Hill: 1996, p. 34).  Hill uses 
the example of the bridge world championships where Israel and its ‘numerous’ enemies 
were drawn in separate qualifying pools in the hope that they would not progress far enough 
to ultimately have to play against each other (Ibid). The Gleneagles Declaration of 
Commonwealth nations in opposition to apartheid discouraged athletes and sportsmen from 
competing against their South African counterparts. This confirmed their earlier commitment 
in 1971 to oppose racism and was followed by their Declaration on Racism and Racial 
Prejudice in 1979. This is in line with one of the IOC’s fundamental principles of 
‘Olympism’ which is: ‘any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on 
grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the 
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Olympic Movement.’ Hence the suspension of South Africa from the Games in 1970 which 
explains its absence from 1972-1988 inclusively. 
 
The Ancient Games and the ‘Ekecheiria’ 
 
Much is made of the peaceful mission of the Olympic Games and how terrorism flies in the 
face of the very ideals that the Olympics stands for. In ancient times, the many different 
autonomous and Greek regions laid down their arms to ‘enjoy the ‘divine peace’ associated 
with the Olympic competitions’ in honour of Zeus (Sinn: 2000, 1). Hostilities ceased for a 
one month period such was the high regard held for the Games which were treated as 
inviolable. What was known as the ekecheiria was ‘an indispensable precondition for 
continuous and undisturbed holding of the Olympic Games’ and it was seen not as an 
arbitrary human institution but as divine law (Lammer, p. 8). This was because ‘the area of 
the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia was declared holy (Greek: hieros) and therefore sacrosanct’ 
and anyone breaking these rules would have to fear the revenge of Zeus (Lammer, p. 4). As 
such, athletes, their coaches and spectators could travel freely to and from Olympia without 
fear of being attacked or robbed, even if they were travelling through land governed by those 
against whom their own rulers were at war. Thus, quite in contrast to the Olympics being 
seen as an opportunity for terrorists to exploit through violence or being cancelled because of 
war (1940, 1944), the Games in ancient times were highly respected and a truce and 
temporary respite from wars took place in their honour, though there were exceptions (see 
below and Lammer pp. 11-12). This did not mean, however, that the Olympics was immune 
from becoming ‘a field of propaganda for the great powers and ... a continuation of war by 
other means (Lammer, p. 16)’.    
 
Not that the games of the period were entirely exempt from political violence. According to 
Miller the Nemean Games of 415 BC were removed from Nemea after destruction in the city, 
though this may not have taken place during the games (Miller: 221). In 364 BC the Eleans 
attacked the Olympics hosted by the Arkadians, before severe losses forced the former to 
retreat. Henceforth they labelled the games as an Anolympiad (Non-Olympiad) (Ibid: 222). 
Later in 235 BC, against a backdrop of political conflict between Argos and Aratos of 
Sikyon, and after the Nemean Games had been moved to Argos, a rival games was held at 
Nemea. Aratos, whose decision it was to launch the rival games at Nemea, ‘captured and sold 
into slavery’ any athlete he caught travelling through his territory to the games at Argos (Ibid: 
222). 
Nevertheless, Miller points out that whatever political manoeuvrings took place, including 
the rare cases of political violence, during the more than a millennium of ancient Greek 
Olympic Games, the ‘games went on’. This, he argues, is in contrast to the past century of 
modern Olympics where Munich 1972 and three major boycotts (1976-84) seriously 
threatened the events (although these games did ‘go on’)  and where the games of 1916, 1940 
and 1944 did not even take place at all because of the political environment (Miller: 225). 
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Notwithstanding these subsequent interruptions, one of the core motivations for Baron de 
Coubertin in reviving the modern Olympic Games towards the end of the nineteenth century 
was ‘for international understanding and peace’ (Barney: 2007, p.225). The Olympic Charter 
describes ‘Olympism’ as seeking to ‘create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the 
educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles’ 
(IOC Charter: p.11). It states that: ‘The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of 
the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned 
with the preservation of human dignity’ (IOC Charter: p.11). And some have gone so far as to 
suggest that ‘Olympism is a philosophy of life which uses sport as a conveyor belt for its 
ideas’ (Hill: 1996, p. 258). Clearly, any attack, therefore, on the Games flouts these ideals. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the terrorists who have targeted or have aimed to 
target the Games have done so deliberately and specifically to oppose these values. More 
accurately, these Olympic aspirations are of relative insignificance compared to the 
objectives of terrorist organisations and the enormous potential that the Olympics provides in 
relation to advertising their cause to a vast international audience.  
 
 
Terrorism and the targeting of sports 
To use the non-state definition of terrorism referred to above: it is a particular method of 
violence and/or the threat of violence carried out by non-state actors in order to coerce a 
government and its population, that often targets civilians, is usually for a political purpose 
and is usually designed to have a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. To 
reiterate, terrorism is therefore a form of communication that is designed to send a message to 
a wider audience beyond the immediate victims. The media, including the internet, provides 
the means through which the message can be delivered while the prestige and popularity of 
the Olympics provides the stage with its audience of millions. The Olympics is one of the 
most major global media events of all time and any attack by terrorists is designed to, and 
almost certainly would, attract unprecedented publicity for the cause of the perpetrators.  
George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was quoted as 
writing that: 
‘a bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-Tung, an 
earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in 
the world like the operation at Munich … The choice of the Olympics, from the 
purely propagandist viewpoint, was 100 per cent successful. It was like painting the 
name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth’ 
(cited in Taylor, 1993:6). 
One of the organisers of the Munich terrorist attack argued that ‘we have to kill their most 
important and famous people. Since we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill 
artists and sportsmen’ (Hoffman, 1998: p.71). This statement implies that the theories of 
displacement targeting discussed elsewhere in this volume (Silke) apply as far back as 1972  
– that as more obvious targets associated with the enemy state become more protected then 
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‘softer’ targets may be selected (at a time when the Olympics did not represent such a 
‘hardened’ target). More recently, for example, A US RAND report noted that in mid 2004 
the South East Asian group Jemaah Islamaya had apparently concluded that targeting ‘well-
protected targets was beyond its capabilities and instead opted for attacks on relatively 
unprotected soft targets’ (Rand, Vol. 2, p73.). So in relation to sports events and people one 
has to consider in the post 9/11 world (where more obvious targets may be well protected) 
that alternative targets may be chosen. With the exception of the Olympics, where its main 
venues are likely to be well protected, sports and sportspeople more broadly may become 
targets as alternative and ‘softer’ options. 
 
Indeed, sports beyond just the Olympics have been the object of terrorist attention before. It 
was widely believed that the IRA was behind the kidnap of the Derby winning racehorse 
Shergar in 1983 and the same group was responsible for coded bomb warnings that resulted 
in the abandonment of the Aintree Grand National in 1997. In May 2002 ETA detonated a car 
bomb outside the Bernabau stadium just before a Champions League football match between 
Real Madrid and Barcelona, and in 2008 a suicide bomber attacked the start of a marathon 
outside Colombo, killing twelve people including a former Olympic marathon runner and a 
national athletics coach. In January 2008 it was reported that the Dakar rally was cancelled 
because of ‘direct’ threats of terrorism (Guardian, January 2008) while the same reason was 
cited for the withdrawal of the English badminton team from the World Championships in 
Hyderabad in August 2009. More profoundly, in March 2009 six policemen and a bus driver 
were killed and seven cricketers and a coach were injured when the Sri Lankan cricket team’s 
convoy was attacked by gunmen in Lahore, and on January 1st 2010 nearly a hundred were 
killed when a suicide bomber attacked a volleyball match in Laki Marwat, Pakistan. A week 
later the Togo national team was attacked by gunmen, killing at least two and injuring seven. 
In April 2010 explosive devices were planted outside Chinnaswamy cricket stadium in 
Bangalore shortly before an Indian Premier League match. 
 
A distinction should be drawn between those terrorist attacks that directly target sports events 
and people (such as Lahore) and those that don’t but that do have broader security 
implications for the safety of such events (such as Mumbai). Terrorism in general has had a 
serious impact on cricket in Pakistan and its prospects of hosting touring teams. The Mumbai 
attacks that lasted from the 26th to the 29th of November 2008 killing over 170 people, and 
that captured the attention of the world’s media, was followed by the withdrawal of India 
from a planned cricket tour there in January 2009. Pakistan also lost out on hosting the 2009 
International Cricket Council Champions Trophy. For many the Lahore attacks only served to 
confirm Pakistan as an insecure place to play cricket. South Africa also withdrew from a 
scheduled October/November 2010 tour there and, at the time of writing, there seems little 
prospect of any international cricket taking place in Pakistan in the foreseeable future. This 
has left its cricket team with the only option of playing its ‘home’ games in neutral venues. 
 
The impact of terrorism on sport has been felt in India as the Mumbai attacks also called into 
question the safety of India as a cricketing venue, with the prestigious Indian Premier League 
having to be relocated to South Africa in April 2009, while after the Lahore attack on a 
 8 
 
sporting target, there have been concerns for the safety of the Commonwealth Games in India 
in October 2010. After Mumbai a leading English cricket commentator proclaimed, due to 
the subsequent ‘oppressive security measures taken in the hotels and cricket grounds in 
Chennai and Mohali before Christmas [2008]’, that ‘if we’re honest we know terrorism’s won 
in India’ (Agnew, 2009). Aside from the direct attack on its cricketers at Lahore, Sri Lankan 
cricket had also suffered some years earlier (in 1996) when a bomb attack in the capital of 
Colombo prompted Australia to withdraw from a World Cup cricket match. Further afield, 
and beyond cricket, golf also became the victim of terrorism when the United States Ryder 
Cup team postponed its golf match with Europe in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.   
 
The targeting of sports – a developing trend? 
Although there has been a spate of terrorist attacks on sports recently it is difficult to argue 
that it represents part of a developing trend where sports events and sportspeople will 
increasingly be targeted by terrorists. One attack that would feature strongly (because of its 
high profile) in any such hypothesis of a developing trend was that carried out on the Togo 
national football team by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), or a 
faction of it. There is, however, some doubt as to whether or not the team itself was 
earmarked for attack. Although such reports should be treated with serious caution, the 
‘Secretary General’ of the group was quoted as saying that ‘this attack was not aimed at the 
Togolese players but at the Angolan forces at the head of the convoy... So it was pure chance 
that the gunfire hit the players’ (Sturcke et al, 2010). It is, of course, difficult to verify how 
genuine these claims are (especially when factions of the FLEC movement have targeted 
foreign nationals before for kidnap), and the attack (particularly the shooting of the team’s 
bus) undoubtedly gave enormous exposure to the group and its cause of an independent 
Cabinda. This does not mean, however, that it generated any sympathy for its goal – in fact 
the ‘condolences’ that were expressed to the victims’ families and the Togolese government 
might suggest that the perpetrators felt the attack to be a mistake that was counterproductive 
to its cause. Certainly, any future such attacks against foreign sports teams would render such 
sentiments as hollow. In conclusion, it is by no means clear, and probably unlikely, that this 
type of attack is something that would be repeated as part of a tactical shift by the group or its 
offshoots.  
 
The other recent attacks were also arguably borne of local and regional agendas. The suicide 
attack on volleyball spectators was said to be a response to Laki Marwat residents who had 
established a militia to expel militants from the area (BBC, 2010), while the Lahore attack on 
the Si Lankan cricket team was the latest riposte in Pakistan’s struggle to combat its 
extremists within. In recent times, therefore, (and the Togo case notwithstanding) it appears 
that only South Asia has suffered from clearly deliberate attacks against sports events and 
people.  
 
It is therefore premature to suggest any trend towards sports targeting on the part of terrorists, 
although terrorism in general has clearly had a major impact on sport in Pakistan and India in 
particular. One should not assume, however, that sports events, teams and individuals would 
not be targeted in the future and in other parts of the world, including Europe and the US, 
especially given the nature of the contemporary international terrorist threat. The utility of 
targeting such events and people varies. Some with nationalist agendas, who may to some 
extent be answerable to domestic political constituencies, might refrain from attacking iconic 
sportspeople who have a wide following, or from causing a high number of casualties at 
 9 
 
sports events, for fear of public revulsion that would be detrimental to their cause.3 For 
others, who are driven by a religious and international ideology that justifies attacking all 
‘infidels’ such restrictions may not apply. This includes Al Qaeda which has a broad category 
of targets and no aversion to causing mass casualties. Moreover, the global attention that the 
Lahore cricket and Togo football episodes attracted might deem such targets as appealing 
options for those whose ideological parameters permit such attacks. The utility of sports 
events as targets, then, lies in the presence of large concentrations of ‘infidels’, at the same 
time as providing the potential for widespread publicity – the higher the target’s profile then 
the greater the publicity. The list of potential sporting targets is endless and their security 
provision is variable. Quite apart from national sporting events, in the UK alone there are 
nearly fifty Premiership, Championship and League football matches every week during the 
football season, not to mention major club rugby fixtures in the Heineken Cup, the Guinness 
Premiership and the Magners League, or indeed county cricket championship fixtures in the 
summer. 
 
 
Al Qaeda and the London Olympics 
 
Beyond the fact that events like the Olympics serve to provide a global stage from which 
terrorists can disseminate their message, and the possibility that sports related targets in 
general may become increasingly preferred as ‘softer’ options, one should also consider the 
nature of the contemporary terrorist threat and what impact this may have on the vulnerability 
of sports events and the Olympics in particular. Al Qaeda sees the United Kingdom as 
culpable for Muslim suffering, most particularly through Britain’s resolute support for the 
United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such bin Laden and his deputy, al Zawahiri, have 
repeatedly warned the UK that it will be held to account for its role abroad. As noted earlier 
in this volume, there are also significant numbers within Britain who would happily oblige by 
perpetrating attacks within the homeland.  
 
While any terrorist attack on the Olympics is also sure to generate enormous publicity for the 
perpetrators such a target might fulfil another Al Qaeda objective – the aim of causing mass 
casualties. Brian Jenkins famously (and, in general, correctly) declared that ‘terrorists want a 
lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’ but it is an assertion that has increasingly 
been brought into question (for example, after Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to kill large numbers 
of people on the Tokyo subway in 1995) and it no longer holds true for the contemporary 
terrorist threat inspired by Al Qaeda. Indeed, the convergence of a radical religious ideology 
that justifies perpetrating mass casualties and a capability of using unconventional weapons 
amounts to a nightmare scenario for governments.  
 
Therefore, any heavy population centres or any event where there is a mass congregation of 
people or ‘infidels’ potentially represents a target for Al Qaeda. Thus, not only do the  
Olympics provide an enormous opportunity to publicise its cause but, such is the open-ended 
category of targets legitimised by its doctrine, it also provides heavy concentrations of people 
                                                            
3 They may, however, still perpetrate lower level attacks that can still cause death and injury and may do so 
with the aim of achieving maximum disruption rather than mass casualties. 
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for the network to target. Indeed, Afzal Ashraf notes in this volume that the Encyclopaedia of 
Afghan Jihad, for example, has included football stadiums as suitable targets.    
 
Beyond the publicity potential and the fact that the games represents a mass casualty target, 
there are other potential reasons for an attack on the Olympics. Much has been made recently 
of the view that Al Qaeda is on the back foot. In a January 2009 interview the Director 
General of MI5 spoke of the progress being made in the UK against Islamic extremists that 
was having a ‘chilling effect’ and was forcing them ‘to keep their heads down’ (MI5 
website). In his Mansion House foreign policy speech in November 2009 the British Prime 
Minister announced that ‘methodically, and patiently, we are disrupting and disabling the 
existing leadership of Al Qaeda’ and ‘since January 2008 seven of the top dozen figures in Al 
Qaeda have been killed, depleting its reserve of experienced leaders and sapping its 
morale’(Gordon Brown, Mansion House speech, November 16th 2009). In this context Al 
Qaeda may want to show that it still has the capability of launching major attacks, not least to 
motivate and mobilise its supporters and to counter such claims that its morale was being 
sapped. Much of its effort is focused in Pakistan but an attack in the UK during games time 
would send a powerful and symbolic message that it still very much has a global capability. It 
would also cite the cause of any attack as the British and NATO presence in Afghanistan (if 
the British are still there) or indeed UK involvement in any other theatre abroad, with the aim 
of undermining the British public’s commitment to such endeavours. Thus, not only would 
the resolve of the British in tolerating or supporting foreign exploits be tested by deaths of 
British soldiers abroad but also potentially by civilian casualties at home. 
The question as to whether or not Al Qaeda will try to attack the Olympic Games of 2012 
depends, of course, as to what is meant by Al Qaeda. The label has been used to describe the 
core Al Qaeda leadership headed by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, those groups 
affiliated to it, and those perhaps relatively autonomous individuals who want to carry out 
acts in the name of Al Qaeda’s ideology. The level at which any attack is planned may have a 
direct bearing on the sophistication and type of tactics that might be used.   
As a decentralised global network it is not often clear which attacks have been planned and 
authorised by Al Qaeda itself and which ones have been carried out by relatively autonomous 
groups of individuals who want to perpetrate terrorist attacks in its name. The targeting 
calculus may be different for the two. This links in with an important debate that has a direct 
implication for the way governments might appropriately respond to the contemporary 
international terrorist threat and, indeed, on the level of sophistication that the authorities in 
2012 may be confronted with in any terrorist attack. The discussion revolves around the 
belief on the one hand that the contemporary threat is largely composed of autonomous 
individuals and groups inspired by Al Qaeda and wanting to act in its name (articulated by 
Marc Sageman in Leaderless Jihad, 2008) and, on the other, that the terrorist plots that are 
being monitored by the security services and those that have been uncovered are more 
centrally directed from elsewhere (usually Pakistan) than has hitherto been acknowledged (a 
view put forward by Bruce Hoffman, 2008). Since this debate materialised in 2008 it appears 
that the latter analysis has been borne out by both security service assessments and court 
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findings in the UK. It transpired, for example, that the transatlantic ‘airline plot’ was largely 
directed from Pakistan and the Prime Minister (citing the Director General of MI5) 
announced that three quarters of the most serious plots that the security service was currently 
tracking have links to Pakistan (Brown, September 4th, 2009). 
This debate on the structure of Al Qaeda has implications both for the type of tactics that 
might be employed and how one might respond to the threat more broadly. If self-motivated 
individuals are acting autonomously in response to how they see their environments (both 
domestically and internationally) then policies can be adopted in the form of social 
programmes to address such perceptions. On the other hand, if key players are involved in 
recruitment and training then an approach that seeks to apprehend these pivotal people might 
take priority. A combination of both approaches would seem to be sensible because even if 
there is some form of direction from countries like Pakistan clearly they are recruiting willing 
people who are either already radicalised to some degree, or are vulnerable to radicalisation. 
As far as the implications for terrorist tactics are concerned, relatively autonomous groups are 
arguably likely to be more amateur and less organised in their approach than those who have 
received a degree of training, organisation and competence from experienced operators 
abroad. The disparate nature of the threat, then, can account for the range of attack scenarios 
that may emanate from what we call Al Qaeda: from the botched London and Glasgow 
attacks of June 2007 to the more sophisticated transatlantic bomb plot of 2006.4 As far as the 
Olympics are concerned the threat scenario includes multiple and simultaneous suicide 
attacks (a hallmark of Al Qaeda operations) as well as amateur attempts to act in Al Qaeda’s 
name. Yet, even with the latter the Olympic context would propel them into highly dramatic 
events. Likewise attacks away from the Olympic site, or against the transport network, but 
clearly designed to disrupt the Olympics, would also receive worldwide attention. Indeed, 
any attack in the UK during the Olympics would arguably be seen as an attack on the 
Olympics itself. The choice of targets, however, would be highly dependent on the perceived 
level of security around them, with preferred targets, such as Olympic venues and certainly 
the Olympic Park itself, becoming less attractive as a result.  
 
Dissident Irish Republicans 
The utility of attacking the Olympic Games is, of course, likely to be different for different 
terrorist organisations. Al Qaeda and those adhering to its ideology have shown a propensity 
to cause mass casualties, hence crowded places may have a particular allure. The tactics of 
other more ‘traditional’ terrorist groups may fall into the category of ‘terrorists want a lot of 
people watching, not a lot of people dead’. This might apply to nationalist/separatist 
organisations that claim to represent a domestic constituency. 
                                                            
4 This is not to say that cells with such direction from elsewhere may not also botch their attacks such as the one 
that attempted to blow up underground trains on July 21st 2005.  
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Of particular concern in this regard for the UK has been the continuing and increasing 
activity of dissident republicans who have now inherited the mantle of traditional republican 
ideology from the IRA. In the longer term if the peace process does not ultimately deliver a 
united Ireland it is a doctrine that is potent enough to lure more Irish republicans to the 
‘physical force’ tradition and its imperative of driving the British from the province through 
the use of violence. On March 7th 2009 Sappers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar were 
shot dead by the Real IRA and, according to the Independent Monitoring Commission, this 
‘represented a major escalation of RIRA activity’ (IMC, 22nd report). Two days later the 
Continuity IRA claimed responsibility for the killing of PC Stephen Carroll. In September 
2009 a 460 pound bomb was discovered in Forkhill, Armagh (IMC, 22nd report). The 
Commission warned that ‘both RIRA and CIRA had remained extremely active and 
dangerous’ that they had shown ‘a capability to plan and organise’ and that their activity 
since the early summer of 2008 ‘had been consistently more serious than at any time since 
[they] had started to report in April 2004’ (IMC, 22nd report). In the six months between 
March and August 2009 ‘the seriousness, range and tempo of their activities all changed for 
the worse’ (IMC, 22nd report). 
 
Dissident republicans were responsible for the Omagh bomb in 1998 that killed 29 people 
and unborn twins. This was in many ways seen as an ‘own goal’ as the public revulsion 
against the attack and the perpetrators forced the Real IRA into a temporary ceasefire. 
Nevertheless, it did not prevent the group from targeting civilian areas once it had re-
launched its campaign. One feature of this particular threat that gives cause for concern for 
2012 is that Irish republicans have traditionally regarded successful attacks on the mainland 
as of much greater value than those carried out in Northern Ireland as they are believed to 
have a much more compelling impact on the British public. Part of IRA strategy when it was 
not on ceasefire was to persuade the British public through coercion to in turn compel the 
government to withdraw from the province.  
The Real IRA (which split from the IRA in 1997) has also targeted the mainland, most 
particularly through a spate of attacks in 2000-01, including bomb attacks on Hammersmith 
Bridge and Ealing. Bombs also exploded outside the BBC Television Centre in Shepherds 
Bush, and outside a postal sorting office in Hendon, while a bomb failed to detonate properly 
in Birmingham city centre. The group also launched an audacious missile attack against the 
MI6 headquarters building. There were no deaths as a result of these attacks (although there 
were injuries) but, at least in the cases of a bomb exploding outside busy pubs at closing time 
in Ealing Broadway (August 2001) and the Birmingham device, this was because of good 
fortune rather than any intent to avoid fatalities on the part of the perpetrators. In relation to 
current dissident republican activity the IMC noted that ‘in April RIRA told a newspaper that 
it would mount an attack in Great Britain when it became opportune to do so’ (IMC, 22nd 
report). There is no question that if the group had the capability of attacking the UK mainland 
then it would follow through with this ominous warning. 
In theory organisations like the Real IRA, as a nationalist/separatist organisation, would not 
be interested in causing mass casualties at the Olympics of 2012 but rather would aim to fully 
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exploit the British Olympics for three main reasons – to generate international publicity for 
its cause, to prove that it is capable of carrying out such an attack, and to disrupt the British 
attempts to deliver a successful and safe games. More strategically, it would want to use 
violence to rejuvenate the traditional republican belief that partition in Ireland and any 
‘partitionist’ political dispensation in Northern Ireland are inherently unsustainable. Dissident 
republicans would, one can assume, derive enormous satisfaction from disrupting the games 
that might otherwise have been a great source of national pride for the British government 
and its people. Any aim to cause as many casualties as possible, however, would prove 
enormously counter-productive (as Omagh showed), diminishing any prospect of increasing 
the little support base that dissident republicans have both at home and abroad in the United 
States.  
Aside from the above considerations, one of the calculations that terrorist organisations have 
to make is whether or not it would be counter-productive to their cause to attack the 
Olympics itself (directly or indirectly). For example, one commentator, speaking of Munich 
1972, suggested that it was a ‘net loss’ for the Palestinian cause arguing that: 
‘Munich ... gave the Palestinians an image of mindless, bloodthirsty thugs, more so as 
the venue for the operation is considered historically a sacrosanct occasion of hope 
and peace. Accordingly, this put the Palestinians outside the circle of civilised 
humanity in the eyes of many who might otherwise have been sympathetic’ (Sanan, p. 
107). 
Indeed, given the international and peaceful ethos of ‘Olympism’ and given that one of the 
aims of many terrorist organisations is to attract international sympathy for its cause (and not 
widespread condemnation) perhaps targeting the Olympics is not conducive to the goals of 
some terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, as noted above, this particular concern might be 
outweighed by the enormous publicity that any attack on the Olympics would generate. In 
this context one could perhaps conclude that, in the case of dissident Irish republicans, they 
would aim to cause maximum disruption to the British showpiece rather than the maximum 
casualties that Al Qaeda has sought to perpetrate.  
 
Terrorist Tactics 
Appreciating the different ideologies of terrorist organisations that might be inclined to attack 
the Olympic Games in turn sheds light on the type of tactics that may be used. The doctrine 
of Al Qaeda justifies attacks against all who are ‘infidels’. Bin Laden himself explicitly stated 
in his 1998 fatwa that: ‘the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and 
military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible to do it ... This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah’. It is this threat 
and the desire to cause mass casualties, therefore, that provides the greatest danger to the 
London Olympics of 2012. One feature of the Olympics that lends itself to the modus 
operandi of Al Qaeda is that it has multiple venues. Simultaneous attacks have been one of 
the hallmarks of the contemporary threat and if Al Qaeda was considering a serious and 
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sophisticated attack on the Olympics then this is a scenario that should be factored into 
security planning. A worrying development that also has to be noted is the organised gun 
attacks in Mumbai and on the Sri Lankan cricket team. Again, the thought of professionally 
trained gunmen shooting at crowds in congested areas with advanced weaponry is a 
concerning one, though it is hoped that security checks will be effective enough to prevent 
such a scenario. 
If dissident Irish republicans were to try to attack the London Olympics it is unlikely that they 
would aim to cause mass casualties. Although the possibility of a bomb attack should not be 
discounted, their level of capability may be limited to hoax calls with the aim of achieving 
maximum disruption. There could, of course, also be acts of sabotage. This would not be a 
new tactic as far as the Olympics are concerned. At the 1992 Winter Olympic Games of 1992 
in Albertville television transmission cables were severed by a member of a radical 
environmentalist in order to disrupt the broadcast of the opening ceremony (Sanan, 128). 
There were also sabotage attacks that attempted to disrupt the opening ceremony of the 1992 
Barcelona games, one of which was carried out by the small Spanish Marxist group GRAPO 
(Sanan, 128).    
 
Conclusion 
Major sports events, and especially the Olympics, provide terrorist organisations with 
opportunities for generating enormous international publicity for their demands. Terrorism is 
communication and these events provide an avenue through which to communicate its 
message to as wide an audience as possible. The Olympics in general is likely to be well 
protected but it still represents an attractive target for terrorists who would aim to benefit 
from the global exposure of any attack and to disrupt the host country’s attempt to deliver a 
‘safe and secure’ Olympics. Other sports events and sportspeople are less well protected than 
those during Games time and there have been a number of recent attacks and threats against 
such targets. Terrorism has lately had a major impact on sport in Pakistan and India, for 
example, but it is too premature to suggest that recent events are part of a growing trend of 
terrorist attacks against sporting targets in general. Nevertheless, in the face of the 
contemporary Al Qaeda threat and its modus operandi, there is no reason to hope that such 
targets will be exempt from the targeting calculus of terrorists in the months and years ahead.  
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